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Effects of Environmental and Land Use Regulation in the Oil
and Gas Industry Using the Wyoming Checkerboard
as an Experimental Design
By MITCH KUNCE, SHELBY GERKING,
This paper estimates the extra costs of drilling for oil and gas on federal land as compared
to private land in the Wyoming Checkerboard.
The Checkerboard, an important site of recent
oil and gas activity, is a 40-mile-wide strip of
land, 20 miles on each side of the Union Pacific
Railroad right-of-way, extending westward approximately 200 miles from Rawlins in south
central Wyoming to the Utah state line. The
Pacific Railway Acts of 1862 and 1864 conveyed to the railroad both surface and mineral
rights to the odd-numbered (square-mile) sections of land in this area, while retaining the
even-numbered sections as federal property.1
Thus, four private (railroad) sections surrounded each federal section and four federal
sections surrounded each private section, giving
land ownership maps of this area the appearance
of a checkerboard.2 Since the 1860’s, some of
the land has changed hands; however, the alter-
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nating ownership pattern is remarkably persistent to the present day and serves as an
experimental control that may be used to identify differences in drilling cost on federal and
private property. Estimates presented suggest
that average drilling costs per well are about
$200,000 higher on federal property than on
private property. This difference is attributed to
more stringent enforcement of environmental
and land use regulations on federal land.
I. Checkerboard Drilling Costs

Environmental aspects of oil and gas field
work in the United States are subject to numerous federal statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
the Antiquities Act, and the Threatened and
Endangered Species Act. These statutes apply
to industry activities on all types of land, although an engineering study (B. Harder et al.,
1995), a survey of operators, landowners, and
federal land managers (Kunce et al., 2001), and
congressional testimony (James T. Hackett,
2001) suggest that enforcement is more stringent on federal land than on private land. In
particular, cultural resources (i.e., Native American artifacts and historical sites) and biological
resources (i.e., wildlife habitat) appear to be
given greater protection on federal property as
compared with private property.
This paper focuses on costs arising from environmental and land use regulations pertaining
to drilling. Drilling, rather than production, is
analyzed for three reasons. First, although environmental contamination can occur at any
stage in the life cycle of oil and gas wells,
drilling is thought to be the activity of greatest
risk because of the large volumes of potentially
hazardous gases and fluids brought to the sur-

* Kunce and Morgan: Department of Economics and
Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071;
Gerking: Department of Economics, University of Central
Florida, Orlando, FL 32816. This research is partially supported by an appropriation from the Wyoming Legislature
(1999 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 168, Section 3).
Results presented may or may not reflect the views of public
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1
For a colorful account of this land transaction and other
inducements granted by the federal government to support
construction of the transcontinental railroad through Wyoming, see Taft A. Larson (1965).
2
Detailed maps showing the current ownership pattern
of land around the Union Pacific railway line in southwestern Wyoming are available from the Wyoming Spatial Data
and Visualization Center (http://www.wims.uwyo.edu).
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face (E. G. Carls et al., 1994). Second, data on
drilling costs, collected by the American Petroleum Institute (various years), are much richer
than the highly aggregated data on production
costs reported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (various years). Third, drilling is a one-time activity,
whereas production from a given well may last
for many years. Production cost conditions can
change over time as subsurface pressure declines causing wells to lose their natural drive.
Thus, it would be easier to analyze drilling costs
than production costs even if the quality of data
on both activities were the same.
Are drilling costs higher on federal property
than on private property in the Wyoming
Checkerboard? The American Petroleum Institute (various years) collects drilling cost data
from operators on completed wells drilled in the
United States, including dry holes. Types of
costs reported include variable cost items such
as labor, materials, supplies, machinery and
tools, water, transportation, fuel, and power.
Also, information about costs of direct overhead
such as for permitting and site preparation, road
building, drilling pit construction, erecting and
dismantling derricks/drilling rigs, hauling and
disposal of waste materials, and site restoration
is obtained. The survey, however, does not request information about lease acquisition costs.
Thus, while the survey data include major elements of drilling cost associated with environmental and land use regulation, they do not
reflect the way in which such regulations may
have been capitalized in the value of a lease.
Also, I.H.S. Energy Group, Inc. compiles data
on additional characteristics of completed wells
and merges this information with the drilling
cost data. Supplementary characteristics measured include depth (in feet), surface land ownership (private, federal, state, or tribal), well
type (oil, gas, or dry), and well location in
latitude and longitude coordinates.3 Data available from I.H.S. contain information on about
325,000 completed onshore wells drilled between 1987–1999.4
3

Longitude and latitude coordinates provided are accurate to five decimal places and place each well to within one
meter of its exact location.
4
Data for earlier years also are available, but measures
of cost are less accurate and location of wells are missing or
at least appear to be less precise than for 1987–1999.
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While the complete data set has a large number of observations with details about each well
drilled, a disadvantage is that components of
total cost are not itemized. This means that the
environmental compliance component of drilling
cost cannot be directly identified and standard
methods cannot be used to estimate a drilling cost function. An estimate of the desired
cost differential, however, can be obtained by
limiting attention to a comparison of drilling
costs on federal and private land in the Wyoming Checkerboard. The land ownership pattern there provides an experimental control for
five factors that would otherwise contaminate
the resulting estimates: (1) remoteness, (2) characteristics of reserves, (3) environmental resources, (4) regional differences in attitudes
toward resource development, and (5) management. In general, federal land tends to be located at greater distances from cities and towns
than rural private land and many tracts of federal land have been set aside for specific purposes (e.g., parks, forests, recreational areas)
that rule out use for permanent settlements.
Thus, drilling costs may be higher on federal
land because it is less accessible. Also, it may
happen that characteristics of hydrocarbon reserves on federal land differ from those on
private land. For example, reserves could be
deeper on federal land than on private land, or
private land could be relatively richer in oil
reserves than gas reserves. Moreover, there may
be differences in the quantity of environmental
resources to protect on federal versus private
land. Differences between scenic attributes of
national park and national forest lands and rural
private land may be most obvious, but less
immediately noticeable ecological differences
may be important as well. In fact, some federal
lands have been set aside to protect specific,
unique or diverse environmental resources. Regarding management, the U.S. Department of
Interior [National Park Service and Bureau of
Land Management (BLM)] manages some federal lands, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture (National Forest Service) manages
others so it is useful to control for possible
policy differences between agencies. Finally,
regional differences in attitudes toward resource
development may affect decision-making on
both federal and private lands. J. Vernon Henderson (1996) discusses the possible importance
of this aspect in a manufacturing context.
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FIGURE 1. CHECKERBOARD MAP
Note: Light gray—BLM land; dark gray—private land; dotted squares—state land.

In the Checkerboard, the pattern of current
land ownership is almost entirely determined by
the land grant provided by the Pacific Railway
Acts of 1862 and 1864. These acts predate
broad-scale environmental concern in the
United States by as much as a century and
predate even the first U.S. national park (Yellowstone), which was established in 1872.
Since that time, certain sections have changed
hands; for example, federal sections have been
sold or traded for private sections to accommodate expansion of towns, to permit better access
to water for agriculture, as well as for other
purposes. In a few cases, the state of Wyoming
traded land owned in other locations for federal
sections in the Checkerboard. Also, the Union
Pacific Railroad has sold all of the sections it
originally owned to other private owners,
mainly for use in agriculture. These land transactions, however, have not greatly disturbed the
original alternating federal–private ownership
pattern established by the Pacific Railway Acts.
Figure 1 shows a portion of the Checkerboard
near the town of Wamsutter, Wyoming. BLM
land is shown in light gray, private land is

shown in dark gray, and state land is shown in
dotted squares. Locations of wells drilled between 1987–1999 are shown using white triangles. Figure 1 also identifies two areas where
federal and private ownership of land has been
consolidated. These consolidations, which are
two of the largest in the entire Checkerboard,
are excluded from the analysis below. Also,
climate and topography of the Checkerboard are
relatively homogeneous (high altitude desert).
This feature, together with the prevailing land
ownership pattern, means that remoteness, reserve characteristics, and the quantity of surface
environmental resources on each type of land in
the Checkerboard should be roughly equal.
Moreover, BLM is responsible for all federal
land there and the area is small enough that
public attitudes toward development are unlikely to vary between locations.
If the Checkerboard is a valid experimental
control, then only characteristics of wells that
are related to environmental and land use regulations should differ between federal land and
private land. To test this, data were obtained for
1,463 wells drilled in the Checkerboard over the
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TABLE 1—DIFFERENCE
AND

MEANS FOR DEPTH, WELL TYPE,
BLM DISTRICT

IN

Test statistic
Federal (private–federal)

Variable

Private

Depth
(in feet)

Mean 10,433
s.e.
102.25

10,706
112.58

⫺1.79

Oil wells
(fraction of total)

Mean 0.066
s.e.
0.0088

0.054
0.0090

0.93

Gas wells
(fraction of total)

Mean 0.818
s.e.
0.0142

0.855
0.0141

⫺1.78

Dry wells
(fraction of total)

Mean 0.116
s.e.
0.0120

0.091
0.0110

1.44

Rawlins district
(fraction of total)

Mean 0.486
s.e.
0.0178

0.422
0.0199

2.39

Rock Springs district Mean 0.277
(fraction of total)
s.e.
0.0159

0.318
0.0188

⫺1.67

Kemmerer district
(fraction of total)

0.260
0.0177

⫺0.99

Observations

Mean 0.237
s.e.
0.0152
789

615

Note: s.e. denotes standard error.

period 1987–1999. The 59 wells drilled on state
land were excluded from the analysis because of
their relatively small number and because the
state did not acquire sections at random. Of the
remaining 1,404 wells, 44 percent were drilled
on federal land, and 56 percent were drilled on
private land. Using a t-test, the null hypothesis
of equality of these proportions is rejected at the
1-percent level (David J. Sheskin, 1997). A
higher proportion of drilling on private land
would be expected if drilling costs on federal
property are higher, or if delays in obtaining
needed permits are longer.
Table 1 presents tests for differences between
means for all other available variables. As
shown, mean well depth on federal land is
10,706 feet while mean well depth on private
land is 10,433 feet, a difference of 273 feet, or
about 2.6 percent.5 The null hypothesis of no
difference between mean well depth on the two
types of property is not rejected at the 5-percent
level using a t-test assuming independent samples with equal variances. This version of the
5
Wells drilled in the Checkerboard are relatively deeper
than those drilled elsewhere. In Wyoming average well
depth over the 1987–1999 period was 6,586 feet, and the
average depth of onshore U.S. wells during this time was
4,904 feet.
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test was applied because the null hypothesis of
equal variances was not rejected at the 1-percent
level using an F-test. Similar distributions of
well depth on federal and private property
would be expected if the checkerboard land
ownership pattern controls for reserve depth.
Table 1 also shows that roughly the same
fractions of oil and gas wells are drilled on
federal and private land, testing at the 5-percent
level for equality of proportions using a t-test.
This outcome suggests that reserve characteristics other than depth are similar on the two types
of land. Also, the smaller percentage of dry
holes on federal property (0.091) versus private
property (0.116) might suggest that greater precautions are taken there to avoid such an outcome, but the difference in these two
proportions is not significantly different from
zero at the 5-percent level.6 Finally, the proportion of wells drilled on federal and private land
in two of the three BLM districts is about the
same. In the Rawlins BLM district, however,
the percentage of wells drilled on private land is
disproportionately greater than the percentage
of wells drilled on federal land. An increase in
drilling on private land in this area in 1999
appears to be responsible for this outcome.7
Table 2 shows that mean real drilling costs
are higher on federal land than on private land.8
Real drilling costs are computed from nominal
drilling costs using the 1995 U.S. GDP deflator
for the years 1987–1999. The top portion of
Table 2 shows that for all wells, average real
drilling costs on federal land are higher by
$201,000 than on private land. This difference

6
The relatively low percentage of dry wells (12 percent)
suggests that development wells may outnumber exploratory wells and perhaps reflects application of recent technological advances such as three-dimensional seismic
reservoir identification methods.
7
If the 1999 data are disregarded, then the null hypothesis of equality between the percentage of federal land wells
drilled in the Rawlins district and the corresponding percentage of private land wells drilled in that district would
not be rejected at 5 percent using a two-tail test. The recent
increase in drilling on private land in this area may reflect
higher costs of drilling on federal property.
8
A regression estimated using all 1,463 observations of
real drilling cost on dummy variables for land ownership
indicates that the null hypothesis of no difference in drilling
cost between private land and state land would not be
rejected at conventional significance levels. Thus, the comparison of drilling costs on federal vs. private land would
appear to be of greatest interest.
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TABLE 2—DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
FOR REAL DRILLING COST

Variable
Real drilling cost
(in thousands of $1995)

Mean
s.e.

Observations

Real drilling cost
(well depth ⬍ 9,600 feet)

Mean
s.e.

Observations
Real drilling cost
(well depth ⬎ 9,600 feet
and ⬍ 12,300 feet)

Mean

Observations

259

Real drilling cost
(well depth ⬎ 12,300 feet)

Mean
s.e.

s.e.

Observations

Private

Federal

885
25.28

1,086
43.06

789

615

500
12.43

553
15.84

280

181

783

879

11.43

15.82

Test statistic
(private–federal)
⫺4.03

⫺2.63

⫺4.92

204
1,421
64.70
250

1,689
101.08

⫺2.23

230

Note: s.e. denotes standard error.

is significant at less than the 1-percent level
using a t-test for equality of means assuming
independent samples with unequal variances.
An F-test of the null hypothesis of equal variances also is rejected at the 1-percent level in
this case. In light of effects controlled by restricting attention to the Wyoming Checkerboard, the drilling cost premium identified on
federal land is cautiously interpreted as the result of increased stringency of application of
environmental and land use regulations. Evaluated at mean real drilling costs for the Checkerboard between 1987–1999 ($965,000/well),
this premium represents a cost increase of about
21.7 percent.
The lower portion of Table 2 shows that the
cost premium for drilling on federal land is
significantly different from zero for each of
three ranges of well depth (using t-tests at less
than the 5-percent level) and, more importantly,
that it increases with the depth of wells.9 For
relatively shallow wells (those at a depth of
9,600 feet or less), the average real drilling cost
on federal land is about $53,000 higher than on
private land. For wells drilled to depths of between 9,600 and 12,300 feet, the cost difference
is $96,000, and for the deepest wells, the cost

9

Further analysis reveals no consistent time trend to
report in the cost premium for drilling on federal land.
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difference is $268,000.10 The null hypothesis
that the private/federal cost differences for the
deepest and shallowest wells are the same can
be rejected at 1 percent using a t-test assuming
independent samples and using the pooled variance from the entire sample to approximate the
subsample variances. A possible explanation for
why the cost premium increases with well depth
is that deeper wells require more time to drill
and on federal property, drilling is more likely
to be interrupted by the more stringent application of environmental and land use regulations
prevailing there. These regulations impose seasonal bans on drilling aimed at protecting archeological sites, big game winter range, and
habitat for several species of birds and raptors.
Thus, particularly on federal property, deep
wells must be drilled incrementally in possibly
inefficient phases that can stretch over a year or
more (Hackett, 2001, p. 7).
These estimates, however, are subject to at
least three qualifications. First, when a number
of wells are drilled in a particular lease area,
operators may have difficulty in allocating fixed
costs (including those associated with environmental compliance) between wells. This problem arises on both federal and private property,
but is a factor that would reduce the precision of
the estimates presented. Second, the estimates
presented are averages of cost premiums for
drilling on federal property, rather than an extra
cost applicable to all drilling sites on this type of
land. For example, quantities of environmental
resources to protect in the Checkerboard vary
greatly over space, so the cost premium may
well be higher on some federal sections than on
others. Third, estimates of the drilling cost pre-

10
Data reported in Table 2 show that the proportion of
deep wells drilled on federal property (0.48) is significantly
greater (at the 1-percent level) than the corresponding proportion of shallow wells (0.39), whereas the opposite outcome might be expected. Operators, however, are
constrained by the depth of reserves when choosing the
depth of wells. Also, if the expected payoff from relatively
deep wells is higher than the expected payoff from relatively shallow wells, then the extra environmental compliance costs on federal property may be less of a deterrent to
drilling as depth increases. In this regard, 70 percent of the
dry holes in the sample were drilled to depths less than
9,600 feet, while 18 percent of dry holes were drilled deeper
than 12,300 feet, so it appears that more information is
accumulated about well prospects as expected depth
increases.
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mium on federal property may be to some extent offset by capitalization of the extra costs
into lease values.
II. Implications and Conclusions

These estimates have several implications for
both public policy and future research. One
policy issue is whether drilling regulations
should be more stringently enforced on federal
land than on other types of land. If the purpose
of the regulations is to internalize negative externalities associated with drilling, then enforcement of regulations should be similar on similar
types of land.
A second issue relates to possible reductions
in output of oil and gas due to more stringent
enforcement of regulations on federal property.
Reduced output from currently producing reserves may add to incentives to explore in the
most environmentally sensitive areas (i.e., national parks and the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge) sooner than otherwise. Also, the value
of reduced future output represents a lowerbound estimate of the opportunity cost of regulation of surface land use. An estimate of this
cost for Wyoming, obtained by valuing estimates of lost future output each year using
estimates of the discounted shadow price of the
resource in the ground, comes to about $1 billion (Kunce et al., 2001). This figure, of course,
must be balanced against benefits of increased
protection of biological, cultural, and other environmental resources on land where oil and gas
exploration and development may occur. Yet,
monetary estimates of these benefits are not
well established and further research may be
warranted to determine whether the current regulatory structure should be made more or less
stringent. Checkerboard land in Wyoming and
other states may be a useful setting for such
studies.
A third issue is concerned with effects on
production tax revenue in states that apply these
types of taxes. Federal policies that restrict output force such states to cut back on public
service expenditures or fund public services
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from other revenue sources. Thus, it is easy to
see why public officials in states such as Wyoming, New Mexico, and Alaska with large
amounts of federal property that rely heavily on
mineral production tax revenue to finance public services can be vocal opponents of more
stringent environmental and land use regulation.
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